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Abstract
This paper analyzes the geographical distribution of physicians across the 26 cantons
of Switzerland from 1960 to 1998. We use a dynamic location model to explain physicians’
choice for their practices by considering market characteristics and medical infrastructure.
Our panel data analysis indicates that physicians avoid areas where physician density has
reached a certain level. Also, specialists’ services may sometimes be substituted for those
provided by general practitioners. These results do not support the common reproach that the
unequal geographic distribution of physicians necessarily reflects market failure. Finally, as
physician densities converge over time, a more equal distribution in the cantons results.
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1 Introduction
How do medical doctors choose where to practice? Why are there many physicians in certain
areas of a country and few in others? Why does this differ also with respect to different
physician types? What are the economic and social consequences of an unequal distribution?
Is there need and room for policy intervention to affect the distribution of physicians across
different regions of a country? Does an unequal distribution reflect market failure in health
care markets due to the asymmetric information between doctors and patients? These and
related questions have challenged economists, for quite a while, and there is now an
increasing demand from policy makers to better understand the underlying mechanisms.
These issues are relevant for several reasons: For most countries health is a special good in
the sense that everybody should have access to health care. Therefore, that access is often
seen as a constitutional right. From this point of view a shortage of physicians as well as their
unequal distribution of physicians geographically and according to different physician types
should be avoided. On the other hand, it is often argued that the health costs per capita
increase with the number of physicians.1  Not only are physicians important suppliers of health
services, but it is widely held that they may also be able to affect the amount of services their
patients consume by using their superior knowledge.2  The possibility that physicians could
induce demand to serve their own interests, may call for policy intervention.
The following papers focus on physicians’ location decisions. Kristiansen and Førde (1992)
use cross-section data from Norway to test the hypothesis that the location of internship and
residency training affects the doctor’s work choice. In accordance with other studies, they find
that the location of postgraduate training influences later location choices. Of consideration is
also where the spouse was reared and the age of the physician, as central areas are preferred
with increasing age.
Chomitz et al. (1998) analyze how changes in the incentive system for medical school
graduates in Indonesia affect their location decisions. From their revealed, as well as stated
preference analyses, they find that changes in incentives significantly affect the choice of a
doctor’s workplace.
Hurley (1990), investigating the role of income in physicians’ practice decisions, considers
specialty, community size and the mode of a physician’s first practice as site dimensions.
                                               
1
  See Schmid (1984).
2
  See Folland et al. (2001).
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According to his simulations with U.S. longitudinal survey data of medical school graduates
from 1960, physicians seem to respond to financial incentives. He concludes that income-
based policies may, therefore, be effective for redistribution.
Bolduc et al. (1996) assess the effect of various incentive measures introduced in Québec to
influence the geographical distribution of physicians. They use data about the initial practice
choice from newly trained general practitioners from 1976 to 1988. According to the
multinomial probit analysis, the region-specific incentive measures reduced geographical
inequalities in the distribution of general practitioners.
Foster and Gorr (1992) use annual state-level data from the U.S. from 1965 until 1982 to
assess the impact of federal policies from the 1960s and 1970s that aimed to increase
physician supply and reduce spatial inequalities. They use a dynamic physician growth model,
which they separately apply for general practitioners and specialists. Both physician types
differ in their location choices. Also, the results suggest that federal policy was not so
effective.
Physician densities vary also substantially among the different regions in Switzerland. This
unequal geographic distribution and the positive correlation between the number of
physicians and health care costs is often seen as evidence for demand inducement and
therefore, market failure. Nevertheless, no specific policies have been implemented in
Switzerland to reduce these inequalities. This stands in contrast to, e.g., the U.S. and Canada,
where policy interventions3  aim to eliminate the unequal distributions commonly associated
with market failure. On the other hand, according to Newhouse et al. (1982), unequal
distributions across geographic areas may well be consistent with well-functioning markets.
The aim of our paper is to investigate the extent to which physicians’ location decisions are
affected by market mechanisms and whether unequal distribution is necessarily caused by
market failure. Therefore, we analyze the evolution of physician growth across the 26 Swiss
cantons from 1960 to 1998. Based on Foster and Gorr (1992), we use a dynamic location
choice model incorporating region-specific market characteristics as well as factors reflecting
the medical and social attractiveness. We investigate whether agglomeration and
attractiveness forces dominate competition effects and whether general practitioners and
                                               
3
  Possible policy measures include restricting the number of postgraduate training and practice sites in most
popular areas, compensating medical school graduates with shorter compulsory service, improving career
opportunities or financial incentives for working in remote places. Because physicians prefer to work where
they are trained, another policy is to locate medical schools and postgraduate training sites in the less popular
regions (see Hurley, 1990).
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specialists differ in their behavior. In addition, we analyze whether large differences in
physician densities among the cantons will persist or whether convergence will occur. The
latter would indicate that physicians’ power to induce demand may not be as strong as usually
believed.
The new aspects of the paper are the analyses of the evolution of physician densities in
Switzerland over a long period by incorporating market forces as well as structural
characteristics. Our year-specific estimates allow assessment of the relative impact of these
factors over time. Finally, convergence analysis provides additional insights about the long-
run behavior of physician densities in Switzerland.
From our panel data analysis we find that competitive forces dominate. Physicians avoid areas
where physician density has reached a certain level. Furthermore, specialists’ services are
often substitute for those provided by general practitioners, forcing them to locate in places
with lower population growth. These findings do not support the commonly made reproach of
demand inducement caused by market failure. Finally, we show that physician densities
converge over time.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the evolution of physician densities
and related policy issues in Switzerland. Section 3 outlines the underlying theoretical model.
The data and the econometric model are explained in section 4. Section 5 contains the
analysis, and section 6 concludes. Some supplementary statistics can be found in the
appendix.
2 Physician Density in Switzerland
Similar to most other countries, Switzerland has been experiencing rapidly rising health care
cost in the last 40 years. In 1996, a Swiss person consumed health care services of 2’499 US$
on average, which is the highest per capita consumption after the U.S. To contain costs in
health care, competitive elements were introduced in the Swiss health system reform of 1996.
The mandatory basic health insurance package determined by the Swiss government, can be
bought from any health insurance company of choice.4  To attract individuals, the health
insurance companies are required to offer attractive premiums, which they may achieve by
forcing physicians to provide cost-effective services. In addition, managed care plans are
                                               
4
  At the moment there are about 100 health insurance companies.
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allowed and consumer incentives are introduced.5  However, in reality, many regulations
counterbalance these competitive elements. For example, health insurance companies may not
adjust premiums to risk or to choose among physicians, but are forced to reimburse any
mandatory service.6  Furthermore, most physicians are still paid on a fee-for-service basis,
where services are valued by tariffs negotiated between the Association of health insurers
(Santésuisse) and the Swiss Medical Association (FMH). Because of this compensation
policy, physicians can easily open their own practice sites since they do not generally bear
large financial risks once they have a medical degree.
Because the number of physicians is regarded as a main determinant of high health care costs,
we must first look at Swiss medical education. Medical school graduates, who study medicine
for about seven years in a university, spend approximately another six years7  working as
assistant doctors in hospitals to be certified as FMH-physicians. This qualification is required
to obtain one of the few permanent positions in hospitals thereafter as specialists. As an
alternative to a hospital career, physicians can start private practice, either as generalists or as
specialists.8  The decision to specialize is usually taken after graduate school and it affects the
choice of training site. When students begin their medical educations, the development of
physicians in 12 to 15 years is determined. Therefore, any policy aiming to influence the
number of medical students, only affects the number of physicians not earlier than after a
generation.
Table 1: Average physician densities for Switzerland
 General practitioners Specialists
Year Per 100,000 persons Persons per generalist Per 100,000 persons Persons per specialist
1960 42 2,479 38 3,649
1970 36 2,915 41 3,914
1980 43 2,429 60 2,275
1990 56 1,824 80 1,549
1998 60 1,694 105 1,184
Figure 1 shows the evolution of physician densities over the considered period, both for
general practitioners and specialists, with their own practice sites and averaged over all 26
                                               
5
  A choice of deductibles is given. For further details, see e.g. Schellhorn (2001) or Domenighetti and Crivelli
(2001).
6
  Except for managed care plans, e.g. HMOs where care is provided through a specific network of health care
providers. However, these plans insure only about 7.5% of the Swiss population.
7
  The exact length of time spent depends on the field of specialization. For further details see the regulations of
the Swiss Medical Association FMH under http://www.fmh.ch/fmh.
8
  A general practioner needs to have the minimum training time of two years as an assistant doctor to open a
private practice.
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cantons of Switzerland. In 1960, the two series started at similar levels. On average, 42
general practitioners serve 100,000 persons or one general practitioner treats 2,479 persons,
whereas for the specialists the numbers are 38 physicians per 100,000 persons or 3,649
persons per physician, respectively (Table 1).
Figure 1: Physician densities from 1960 to 1998 (per 100,000 persons)
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Until 1975 the physician density had been considered too small, since it was below the
number recommended by the World Health Organization.9  While physician density remained
rather stable, the Swiss economy flourished and social security systems expanded. Due to
easier access to medical schools, the number of medical students tripled between 1960 and
1974,10  resulting in an increase in the number of physicians 15 years later. General
practitioners and specialists grew by 93% and 241%, respectively, but the population had
increased only by 32% from 1960 to 1998. Because the number of specialists had grown
faster than that of general practitioners increased, densities differ substantially from each
other in 1998, when 105 specialists but only 60 general practitioners served 100,000 persons
on average. Similar developments have been observed in the U.S. and in Canada.11 
                                               
9
  Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), 15.11.1974, Nr. 492.
10
  The requirement to study Latin at high school had been eliminated.
11
  See Bolduc et al. (1996).
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Figure 2: Physician densities for the Swiss cantons in 1998
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Since 1980, the physician density, especially of specialists, has been regarded as too high.12
Nevertheless, access to medical education was not constrained until 1998. Interventions were
limited to information campaigns held at high schools to inform potential medical students
about a possible oversupply of physicians. Today, however, most universities apply an
aptitude test to control the number of medical students.
In general, the Swiss political system grants a large amount of sovereignty to its 26 cantons.
Because each is, among other issues, responsible for its own health care system, it is rather
difficult to implement a unified policy for them all, a fact which leads to additional
heterogeneity among them. Figure 2 and Table 5 in the appendix show physician densities of
all Swiss cantons in 1998. It is obvious that physician densities differ among the cantons with
a much higher variation for specialists. For general practitioners, densities vary between 47
and 75 physicians per 100,000 persons; for specialists the numbers lie between 41 and 285.
Western and southern Switzerland account for the highest number of specialists. City cantons,
e.g. Basel-Stadt (BS) and Geneva (GE), or cantons with university hospitals13  seem to attract
more specialists. The total number of hospital beds per canton has generally had a positive
effect on the supply of physicians, especially of specialists.14  Where tourism plays an
important role (e.g. the cantons GR, TI and VS), physician densities seem higher as well, and
this is particularly true for general practitioners.
3 Theory
The geographic distribution of physicians can be studied by analyzing the location choice
process of physicians.15  As it often is difficult to obtain relevant information to empirically
determine the underlying processes, a more feasible way is to consider the aggregate outcome
of these location decisions, i.e., to look at the distribution of physicians in different regions
and to relate them to their determinants.
There exist two main categories of physicians’ location choice models: The static model
approach, where distribution of physicians is estimated at a given point in time, and dynamic
framework, which takes into account variations over time. According to Foster and Gorr
                                               
12
  The issue became a public concern when the Council of Swiss Universities (Schweizerische
Hochschulkonferenz) initiated a study, conducted by Gilliand and Eichenberger (1981), about future
development of the physician population.
13
  There is not a university in every Swiss canton. Six have a university hospital, i.e. Basel-Stadt (BS), Bern
(BE), Fribourg (FR), Geneva (GE), Waadt (VD) and Zurich (ZH).
14
  Data source: Federal Department of Statistics.
15
  See also Timmermans and Golledge (1990).
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(1992), the main factors which affect the location of a physician’s practice are the population
in a region, its professional climate, its social environment, and market conditions.
A region’s population is a direct measure of market size. Physicians are expected to be
sensitive to changes in population growth.16  Professional climate refers to possible interaction
with colleagues, sufficient access to hospitals and other medical facilities. The attractiveness
of professional climate positively affects the supply of physicians. Also influencing the
location choice of physicians are social amenities, such as educational facilities, entertainment
and recreational opportunities, as well as shopping facilities. The better the social amenities,
the more physicians are attracted to a region.
We denote these three determinants, which all have a positive effect on the supply of
physicians in an area, as agglomeration and attractiveness effects. Besides these effects, there
exist market conditions which affect physician growth negatively. When the supply of
physicians reaches a certain level in a region, the competition effect might become strong.
Income potential and the number of practice opportunities for new physicians decrease.
Therefore, new physicians do not enter this market anymore but are more likely to open
practice sites in regions with lower level of physician density, and physicians then become
more equally distributed.
In the context of geographic distribution of physicians, the issue of supplier-induced demand
(SID) and the implicitly underlying market failure is often addressed. SID refers to the ability
of physicians to generate demand in response to fee changes, declining market shares, or
changes in labor-leisure relations.17  Academic and also policy disagree on its definition, and
disagreement increases when talking about tests for providing empirical evidence and
measuring SID.18  If physicians are indeed able to induce demand, competition effects may not
be relevant and agglomerative forces are dominating.
Regardless whether SID is present or not, there exist two opposite forces. To test which of
these forces is stronger, an empirical investigation is necessary. If the data show that
competition effects are dominating, SID might not be so relevant. However, if we find
dominating agglomerative effects, we cannot differentiate whether this is caused by a weak
competition effect or by SID.
                                               
16
  Besides population growth, there exist additional factors that may affect demand for physicians’ services
(e.g., aging of population, increase in level of education and income, changing environmental factors like
stress at work or pollution), which are not explicitly considered here.
17
  De Jaegher and Jegers (2000) assume that physicians are constrained by patient information in inducing
demand.
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4 Data and model
For the analyses of physicians’ location choices we use annual data of the 26 cantons of
Switzerland from 1960 through 1998.19  The data include physicians working in a practice as
general practitioners or as specialists and are provided by the Federal Department of
Statistics. Not included are assistant doctors and specialists working only in hospitals.
According to the theory outlined above, we estimate a simple dynamic physician growth and
locational behavior model, i.e.,
,D
MEDUNIGPOP.LDENS.LDENS.LGPHYS
it't't
i5it4
2
jit3jit21jit
ε+ γ+
α+α+α+α+α=
  (1)
where j=G,S (general practitioner, specialist), i=1,…,26, t, t’=1960,…,1998.
The dependent variable, physician growth (GPHYS ), is calculated by using a three-year
moving average to smooth for annual variations. As explanatory variables three indicators for
agglomeration, attractiveness and competition effects are considered.
L.DENS is physician density at the start of the period for calculating GPHYS . The sign of its
coefficient is ambiguous, since L.DENS captures two opposing mechanisms. Reflecting
agglomerative forces, the coefficient of L.DENS is expected to be positive. However, with
increasing competitive forces the coefficient of L.DENS is expected to be negative. To allow
for nonlinearity, we include the square of L.DENS in the estimation.
L.GPOP is population growth and is calculated again by using a three-year moving average
and by taking the lagged value. We expect L.GPOP to influence general practitioners and
specialists differently. Specialists are typically multiproduct firms, i.e., they not only provide
special treatments, but they also sell services normally delivered by general practitioners.
Because specialists are unique providers of certain services, they usually first settle in larger
cities. The ability to produce multiple services allows specialists to compete with general
practitioners. These substitution elements discourage general practitioners from settling in
larger cities, that are typically characterized by higher population growth rates. Therefore, we
                                                                                                                                                       
18
  See, e.g., Labelle et al. (1994) for an overview.
19
  The panel is not balanced, since physician data for the two split cantons Nidwalden and Obwalden are not
available before 1967. Furthermore, in 1978 the canton Jura was created; it had previously be included in the
canton Bern.
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expect L.GPOP to enter into the model with a positive sign for specialists and a negative sign
for general practitioners.20 
MEDUNI is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the canton has a university
hospital.21  It is a supplementary indicator to L.DENS and captures a region’s medical
attractiveness. Furthermore, MEDUNI accounts for potential differences in the cantons’
policy measures, which may differ depending on the existence of a university with a medical
faculty. A positive coefficient of MEDUNI indicates that the presence of a university hospital
attracts more physicians, which is further evidence for the presence of agglomerative forces.
In case of a negative sign, the competition effect dominates.
Finally, we include a yearly dummy variable (Dt’) as another explanatory variable into the
estimation to pick up other year-specific effects. Dt’ takes on the value of one if t’=t, zero else.
In addition to the simple case as described by equation (1), we specify an extended model that
allows us to estimate time-varying parameters. For this purpose, we multiply L.DENS with
the yearly dummy variable (Dt’). The other variables are defined as in equation (1).
it't'ti3it2'tjit't1jit DMEDUNIGPOP.LDDENS.LGPHYS ε+ γ+α+α+η+α= , (2)
where j=G,S (general practitioner, specialist), i=1,…,26, t, t’=1960,…,1998.
Table 2 summarizes the description of our data.
Table 2: Description of data
Variable Description
i Index of canton: i=1,…,26
t, t’ Year of observation: t, t’=1960,..,1998
j Type of physician: G=general practitioner, S=specialist
GPHYSjit Physician growth in %
jitGPHYS  3-year moving average of physician growth in % (GPHYSjit-1+GPHYSjit+ GPHYSjit+1)/3
L.DENSjit Lagged physician density (number of physicians for 100’000 persons)
itL.GPOP  Lagged 3-year moving average of population growth in %
MEDUNIi Dummy variable=1 if canton has a university hospital, =0 else
Dt’ Dummy variable=1 if t=t’, =0 else

                                               
20
  See Newhouse et al. (1982).
21
  See footnote 13.
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5 Analysis
We estimate the simple model of equation (1) by applying different estimation techniques to
check for robustness of our results. The GLS estimation (A) with heteroscedastic error
structure and cross-sectional correlation allows for differences in the variance as well as a
correlation among the 26 cantons. The GLS estimation (B) relaxes not only the assumption of
noncross-sectional correlation, but of nonautocorrelation as well. Finally, the fixed effect
model estimation (C) captures differences among the cantons, for which we do not directly
control, in the constant term.22
Table 3: Physician growth in the simple model (1963-1997)
 General practitioners Specialists
 GLSa  Fixed Effectb GLSa  Fixed Effectb
Variablec (A)  (B)  (C) (A)  (B)  (C)
L.DENS 0.007
(0.016)
-0.001
(0.038)
0.043
(0.108)
-0.075***
(0.003)
-0.054***
(0.007)
-0.096**
(0.049)
L.DENS2 -0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
L.GPOP  -0.123***
(0.036)
-0.036
(0.057)
-0.196*
(0.104)
0.386***
(0.048)
0.407***
(0.086)
0.376**
(0.151)
MEDUNI -0.059
(0.056)
-0.082
(0.140)
 0.801***
(0.061)
0.645***
(0.192)

Constant 0.154
(0.411
-0.137
(0.962)
0.589
(1.259)
4.123***
(0.158)
3.500***
(0.327)
5.360***
(1.589)
N 805 805 859 805 805 855
Log Likelihood -620.371 -551.246   -644.742
F   3.58***   1.99***
*,**,*** Coefficient different from zero with an error probability of 10%, 5%, 1%.
a We apply two GLS-estimation methods: (A) heteroscedastic error structure with cross-sectional correlation,
(B) heteroscedastic error structure with cross-sectional correlation and autocorrelation. For the GLS
estimations only 23 cantons are included, since for the cantons Jura, Obwalden and Appenzell Innerrhoden
data is not available for all the time periods and therefore, the panel is not balanced.
b
 The within estimator for the fixed-effects model allows the disturbance term to follow an AR(1) process. The
sizes of R-squares are: within=0.14, between=0.20 and overall=0.29 for general practitioners; within=0.08,
between=0.33 and overall=0.13 for specialists.
c
 Time dummies are included into the estimation.

Table 3 shows that agglomerative forces are at work for general practitioners, since the
coefficient of L.DENS is positive in two of three cases, though never statistically significantly
different from zero.23  This holds as long as L.DENS is of small size. However, the negative
                                               
22
  Given that our sample includes all cantons in Switzerland and is therefore not a random sample, the fixed
effects model specification is appropriate. In addition, given the results from a modified version of the
Durbin-Watson test, we allow the disturbance term to follow an AR(1) process (see also Bhargave et al.
1982).
23
  Even though the coefficients of L.DENS and L.DENS2  are not significantly different from zero, LR-tests
showed that including them into the model is preferred.
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coefficient of L.DENS squared provides evidence that the agglomeration effect weakens with
higher density levels: when density reaches approximately 23 general practitioners per
100,000 persons, the competition effect is dominating even for estimation (C).24  For the
specialists, the coefficient of L.DENS is negative, whereas the coefficient of L.DENS squared
is positive but almost zero. Therefore, the competition effect seems to dominate the
agglomeration and attractiveness effects for the specialists during the entire observed period,
which stands in contrast to the results from general practitioners.
The population growth of former periods L.GPOP  negatively affects the growth of general
practitioners, but it has a positive effect on specialists’ growth rate. These findings seem to
confirm our hypothesis that specialists’ services are a substitute of general practitioners’
services.
As to MEDUNI, it positively affects the specialists’ growth rate, indicating that agglomerative
forces are present. But it has a negative, though nonsignificant effect, on the growth rate of
general practitioners. Due to the substitution elements between specialists and general
practitioners, the latter seem discouraged from settling in cantons with university hospitals.25
To get year-specific coefficients for the density variable, we estimate the extended model
according to equation (2) by applying two GLS estimation methods, a fixed effects model
estimation as well as yearly OLS-regressions.26  Figure 3 and Figure 4 graphically represent
the year-specific estimates for L.DENS interacted with the time dummies.27  At first sight, we
observe the coefficients of L.DENS to vary over the years, and this variation is clearly higher
for general practitioners. Looking at the evolution over time, the parameter estimates for
specialists appear to be more stationary over time.28  Finally, the different estimation methods
provide similar results for most of the years.
                                               
24
  To determine the level of L.DENS where the competition effect is dominating, we differentiate equation (1)








=α+α=
∂
∂ 0DENS.L2
DENS.L
GPHYS
32  and solve for L.DENS.
25
  Note that we do not report any results for the fixed effects estimation since MEDUNI is constant over time
and therefore dropped.
26
  The main advantage of yearly OLS-regressions is that it produces yearly estimates for all the variables
included in our model. However, our results are somehow restricted since the number of cross-section units
varies between 23 and 26 cantons (Table 7 and Table 8 in the appendix).
27
  Note that we loose the first three observations (years 1960, 1961 and 1962) as well as the last one (year 1998)
due to our construction of lagged moving average growth variables.
28
  Regressing the coefficients against time and a constant term yields negative and significant results for all the
models of the general practitioners and no significant results for specialists, except for model (C), where
there is also a negative and significant time trend.
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From the year-specific estimates, which we include in Table 6 of the appendix, we see that the
coefficients of the interacted L.DENS variables are not significantly different from zero for all
the years and all the estimation methods. As outlined earlier, a positive sign of the coefficient
tells us that the agglomeration and attractiveness effects dominate. We find evidence for such
an outcome for general practitioners during the late 1960s but not for specialists. This time
period is characterized by economic growth and a perceived undersupply of physicians. A
negative sign of L.DENS interacted with the time dummies is evidence for dominance of the
competition effect, which leads to a more equal distribution in the long run. Our results
suggest that such a mechanism is at work: For general practitioners, we find evidence for this
effect from the 1970s on, while for specialists it seems to exist in most periods, so already
since the beginning of the considered time period.
Figure 3: Estimated paths of L.DENS coefficients for general practitioners
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Figure 4: Estimated paths of L.DENS coefficients for specialist physicians
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The results of the other explaining variables of the extended model are as follows (Table 6).
As to population growth, we find again negative coefficients for general practitioners and
significantly positive ones for specialists, confirming our theoretical predictions. In addition,
the existence of a university hospital negatively influences the growth rate of general
practitioners, whereas it attracts specialists.
The dominating competition effect indicates that physician densities became more equal from
1960 to 1998. To check whether physician densities between the 26 cantons really converge,
we apply two convergence measures commonly used in growth theory.29  σ-convergence looks
at the spread of values during a time period and shows whether the different cantons or
regions converge despite shocks and disturbances. β-convergence looks at the impact of the
level of a variable y on its growth rate by applying regression analysis. For convergence, the
coefficient of the level of y must be negative, i.e. cantons with lower levels grow faster.
However, β-convergence is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for convergence. A
higher average growth rate of underdeveloped regions does not imply that the spread of y has
diminished as well. Therefore, σ-convergence, as well as β-convergence, has to be present.
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Figure 5: Variation coefficients of physician density from 1961 to 1997
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For each year, we calculate the variation coefficient of physician densities (VCt), which
normalizes the standard deviation with the mean. Figure 5 shows VCt  of physician density
from 1961 to 1997. The cantons differ substantially regarding the types of physicians, since
VCt  for specialists is always much greater than VCt  for generalists. However, both types of
physician densities seem to converge among the cantons. To test for σ-convergence, we
compare VC1961  (starting period) to VC1997  (last period). For both types of physicians VCt
diminishes over time, indicating that convergence is present. In addition, we test σ-
convergence in a trend model by regressing VCt  against the time. Again, the presence of σ-
convergence is confirmed, as the coefficient of time is significantly negative for both cases
(Table 4).
Finally, we test for β-convergence by regressing the growth rate of physician density against
the starting level of physician density. In both cases, the coefficient is negative, although it is
statistically significant only for specialists. However, if we calculate the growth rate of
physician density by using a moving average containing five years instead of three years, both
coefficients of the level of physician density become significantly negative (Table 4).
                                                                                                                                                       
29
  See e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Schmidt (1997).
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Table 4: Convergence measures for physician density between the Swiss cantons
(t-value in parenthesis)
 General practitioners  Specialists
σ-convergence 
VC1961 0.2137 0.6804
VC1997 0.1334 0.5705
Coefficient of trend modela -0.0023
(-86.71)
-0.0031
(-63.41)
β-convergenceb 
Coefficient of level of physician density, 3 years moving average -0.0050
(-0.50)
-0.0112
(-3.05)
Coefficient of level of physician density, 5 years moving average -0.0259
(-3.91)
-0.0152
(-4.81)
a
  The trend model is estimated according to the equation: it21jit tVC ε+α+α= .
b
 β-convergence is estimated according to: itjit21jis DENS.LGDENS ε+α+α= , where GDENS is the growth
rate of physician density, j= general practitioner, specialist, i=1,…,26 and t=1961,…1997.

Even though there still exist significant differences among the density levels of the different
Swiss cantons, we conclude that the physicians’ distribution has become less unequal over the
years. This finding is somehow consistent with our former findings about the existence of
competitive forces, that induce physicians to move from most medically populated areas.
6 Conclusions
The focus of this paper is on whether physicians’ location choices are affected by market
mechanisms and whether an unequal distribution of physicians necessarily reflects market
failure. We analyzed the evolution of physician densities in Switzerland from 1960 to 1998.
We used a dynamic location choice model that incorporates region-specific market
characteristics and factors reflecting medical and social attractiveness. We investigated
whether agglomeration and attractiveness forces dominate competition effects and whether
the behavior of general practitioners and specialists differs.
From our analysis, we find that physicians choose locations based on market characteristics
and forces. Specialists are attracted to areas that offer a good professional climate and a high
population growth. However, competition effects are dominating agglomerative forces over
the whole observed period. In addition, our results show that specialists are able to substitute
services provided by general practitioners. Being unique providers of certain services,
specialists settle first in larger cities and force general practitioners to locate in regions
characterized by lower population growth. The observed unequal geographic distribution of
physicians, therefore, does not necessarily reflect market failure. Finally, we show that the
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physician densities of the 26 Swiss cantons converge over time, resulting in a more equal
distribution.
Notwithstanding the rather large existing literature on physician behavior, more research is
needed, and this holds true particularly for Switzerland. In relation to market failure, for
instance, most of the numerous studies focus on how much services are induced by
physicians. As Labelle et al. (1994) outline, however, the important question is about the
consequences of demand inducement for consumers’ utility, i.e., what are the effects of
induced services on the health status of the patients. Also, there exists political pressure that
health insurance companies may no longer be forced to sign contracts with every physician of
their canton, thus introducing more competitive elements into the Swiss health care market.
On the other hand, the recent introduction of aptitude tests for medical studies at most Swiss
universities may reduce pressure from the supply side. All these circumstances will certainly
further affect the distribution of physicians, and some of these issues will be addressed in
future research.
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7 Appendix
Table 5: Physician densities for the Swiss cantons in 1998
  Generalists Specialists
Canton Per 100,000
persons
Rank Per 100,000
persons
Rank
AG Aargau 50 23 84 17
AR Appenzell Ausserrhoden 65 6 77 19
AI Appenzell Innerrhoden 48 24 41 26
BL Basel-Land 63 8 117 8
BS Basel-Stadt 58 13 285 1
BE Bern 58 13 130 5
FR Fribourg 47 25 95 12
GE Genf 56 20 254 2
GL Glarus 65 6 57 22
GR Graubünden 75 1 94 13
JU Jura 58 13 88 15
LU Luzern 57 18 81 18
NE Neuenburg 69 4 122 6
NW Nidwalden 47 25 55 23
OW Obwalden 57 18 44 25
SH Schaffhausen 72 3 108 9
SZ Schwyz 54 22 54 24
SO Solothurn 62 10 86 16
SG St. Gallen 61 12 89 14
TE Tessin 63 8 122 6
TG Thurgau 58 13 62 21
UR Uri 58 13 63 20
VD Waadt 73 2 162 3
VS Wallis 62 10 101 11
ZG Zug 56 20 105 10
ZH Zürich 68 5 145 4
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Table 6: GLS and fixed effect estimations of extended model
 General practitioners Specialists
 GLSa Fixed Effectb GLSa Fixed Effectb
Variablec (A) (B)  (C) (A) (B)  (C)
L.DENS*D1963 0.004
(0.016)
0.025
(0.024)
 -0.017***
(0.004)
-0.015***
(0.004)

L.DENS*D1964 0.051***
(0.017)
0.074***
(0.025)
0.044
(0.061)
-0.025***
(0.004)
-0.020***
(0.004)
-0.044
(0.037)
L.DENS*D1965 -0.023
(0.016)
-0.013
(0.025)
-0.046
(0.072)
-0.032***
(0.004)
-0.035***
(0.005)
-0.078
(0.050)
L.DENS*D1966 -0.058***
(0.016)
-0.005
(0.024)
-0.025
(0.076)
-0.035***
(0.004)
-0.039***
(0.004)
-0.091*
(0.055)
L.DENS*D1967 0.042**
(0.017)
0.077***
(0.026)
0.072
(0.084)
-0.043***
(0.004)
-0.039***
(0.004)
-0.096
(0.059)
L.DENS*D1968 0.164***
(0.018)
0.174***
(0.027)
0.158*
(0.084)
0.005
(0.004)
0.002
(0.006)
-0.056
(0.061)
L.DENS*D1969 0.125***
(0.017)
0.133***
(0.026)
0.123
(0.079)
0.005
(0.004)
0.009*
(0.005)
-0.049
(0.060)
L.DENS*D1970 -0.009
(0.017)
0.000
(0.025)
0.017
(0.076)
-0.030***
(0.004)
-0.024***
(0.005)
-0.080
(0.060)
L.DENS*D1971 -0.132***
(0.016)
-0.124***
(0.024)
-0.147*
(0.076)
-0.023***
(0.004)
-0.016***
(0.004)
-0.073
(0.058)
L.DENS*D1972 -0.126***
(0.017)
-0.117***
(0.025)
-0.135*
(0.075)
-0.041***
(0.004)
-0.032***
(0.004)
-0.147**
(0.058)
L.DENS*D1973 -0.127***
(0.018)
-0.132***
(0.027)
-0.113
(0.085)
-0.007*
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.120**
(0.057)
L.DENS*D1974 -0.045**
(0.018)
-0.047*
(0.026)
-0.028
(0.083)
-0.040***
(0.003)
-0.033***
(0.004)
-0.142***
(0.055)
L.DENS*D1975 -0.146***
(0.017)
-0.157***
(0.026)
-0.094
(0.077)
-0.031***
(0.003)
-0.029***
(0.004)
-0.081
(0.053)
L.DENS*D1976 -0.109***
(0.017)
-0.125***
(0.025)
-0.061
(0.077)
-0.029***
(0.003)
-0.024***
(0.004)
-0.097*
(0.051)
L.DENS*D1977 -0.089***
(0.018)
-0.080***
(0.027)
-0.040
(0.083)
-0.054***
(0.003)
-0.048***
(0.004)
-0.120**
(0.049)
L.DENS*D1978 -0.023
(0.017)
-0.035
(0.026)
0.028
(0.082)
-0.051***
(0.003)
-0.047***
(0.003)
-0.112**
(0.047)
L.DENS*D1979 -0.067***
(0.016)
-0.052**
(0.024)
0.032
(0.073)
-0.048***
(0.003)
-0.044***
(0.003)
-0.099**
(0.046)
L.DENS*D1980 -0.089***
(0.016)
-0.100***
(0.024)
-0.175**
(0.075)
-0.013***
(0.003)
-0.009***
(0.003)
-0.058
(0.043)
L.DENS*D1981 -0.059***
(0.016)
-0.031
(0.023)
-0.160**
(0.073)
-0.033***
(0.003)
-0.027***
(0.003)
-0.070*
(0.042)
L.DENS*D1982 -0.072***
(0.016)
-0.034
(0.024)
-0.149**
(0.076)
-0.054***
(0.003)
-0.051***
(0.003)
-0.071*
(0.040)
L.DENS*D1983 -0.086***
(0.015)
-0.015
(0.022)
-0.158**
(0.073)
-0.080***
(0.002)
-0.079***
(0.003)
-0.123***
(0.037)
L.DENS*D1984 -0.081***
(0.015)
0.005
(0.022)
-0.084
(0.072)
-0.074***
(0.002)
-0.074***
(0.003)
-0.109***
(0.037)
L.DENS*D1985 -0.058***
(0.015)
0.008
(0.021)
-0.020
(0.069)
-0.055***
(0.002)
-0.056***
(0.003)
-0.102***
(0.038)
L.DENS*D1986 -0.012
(0.014)
0.021
(0.018)
0.032
(0.066)
-0.012***
(0.002)
-0.015***
(0.003)
-0.041
(0.037)
L.DENS*D1987 -0.033**
(0.014)
-0.023
(0.019)
-0.029
(0.069)
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.043
(0.035)
L.DENS*D1988 -0.042***
(0.013)
-0.031*
(0.018)
-0.028
(0.060)
-0.010***
(0.002)
-0.009***
(0.003)
-0.042
(0.035)
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(0.013) (0.018) (0.060) (0.002) (0.003) (0.035)
L.DENS*D1989 -0.110***
(0.013)
-0.084***
(0.017)
-0.120**
(0.059)
-0.017***
(0.002)
-0.014***
(0.003)
-0.057*
(0.034)
L.DENS*D1990 -0.124***
(0.014)
-0.109***
(0.018)
-0.134**
(0.062)
-0.009***
(0.002)
-0.009***
(0.003)
-0.049
(0.033)
L.DENS*D1991 -0.112***
(0.016)
-0.096***
(0.020)
-0.095
(0.068)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.044
(0.034)
L.DENS*D1992 -0.084***
(0.016)
-0.085***
(0.021)
-0.041
(0.067)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.023
(0.033)
L.DENS*D1993 -0.050***
(0.017)
-0.043**
(0.021)
0.054
(0.067)
-0.005***
(0.002)
-0.005**
(0.002)
-0.032
(0.031)
L.DENS*D1994 -0.074***
(0.017)
-0.068***
(0.022)
-0.138**
(0.066)
-0.020***
(0.002)
-0.018***
(0.002)
-0.041
(0.029)
L.DENS*D1995 -0.057***
(0.016)
-0.040*
(0.020)
-0.069
(0.059)
-0.012***
(0.002)
-0.016***
(0.002)
-0.047
(0.029)
L.DENS*D1996 -0.019
(0.016)
-0.045**
(0.021)
-0.243***
(0.071)
-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.010***
(0.002)
-0.039
(0.028)
L.DENS*D1997 -0.044***
(0.016)
-0.051**
(0.021)
-0.115
(0.071)
-0.018***
(0.002)
-0.020***
(0.002)
-0.056**
(0.027)
L.GPOP  -0.110***
(0.035)
-0.022
(0.061)
-0.141
(0.104)
0.300***
(0.047)
0.319***
(0.073)
0.323**
(0.156)
MEDUNI -0.125**
(0.062)
-0.046
(0.128)
 0.428***
(0.044)
0.351*
(0.208)

Constant 6.735***
(1.012)
3.644***
(1.316)
3.095*
(1.778)
1.944***
(0.194)
1.942***
(0.205)
2.974**
(1.308)
N 805 805 859 805 805 855
Log Likelihood -628.416 -510.131  -735.851 -617.483
F   2.86***   1.69***
*,**,*** Coefficient different from zero with an error probability of 10%, 5%, 1%.
a We apply two GLS-estimation methods: (A) heteroscedastic error structure with cross-sectional correlation,
(B) heteroscedastic error structure with cross-sectional correlation and autocorrelation. For the GLS
estimations only 23 cantons are included, since for the cantons Jura, Obwalden and Appenzell Innerrhoden
data is not available for all the time periods and therefore, the panel is not balanced.
b The fixed effects model (C) is estimated with the error term following an AR(1) process. Note that the first
year (1963) is dropped in order to get correct estimates of the group mean. The sizes of R-squares are:
within=0.20, between=0.13 and overall=0.27 for general practitioners; within=0.13, between=0.25 and
overall=0.14 for specialists.
c Time dummies are included into the estimation.
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Table 7: Yearly OLS-regressions of extended model for general practitioners
Year L.DENS L.GPOP  MEDUNI Constant R2  N
1963 -0.053 0.532 -0.829 0.096 0.072 24
1964 0.052 0.083 -0.496 -3.251 0.032 24
1965 -0.047 0.247 0.580 0.613 0.075 24
1966 -0.068 0.146 -0.525 2.394 0.045 24
1967 0.072 0.040 -0.958 -2.349 0.084 24
1968 0.117** -0.024 -2.373*** -3.415 0.536 24
1969 0.083* -0.087** -1.918*** -1.870 0.516 24
1970 -0.050 -0.300*** -1.451 3.509 0.333 25
1971 -0.198*** -1.124*** -1.480 10.597*** 0.513 25
1972 -0.162*** -1.526*** -1.398 9.539*** 0.449 25
1973 -0.143*** -1.205*** -0.756 8.056*** 0.454 25
1974 -0.044 -1.645* -0.095 4.267 0.133 25
1975 -0.156* -1.608* 0.399 7.615** 0.310 25
1976 -0.030 -0.402 1.344 2.848 0.084 25
1977 -0.055 0.865 0.636 4.621 0.083 25
1978 0.021 0.821 0.549 1.873 0.021 25
1979 0.076 1.026 2.345 -0.800 0.102 25
1980 -0.187* 1.695** 0.206 11.102** 0.333 25
1981 -0.249* 2.282** 0.008 14.167** 0.373 26
1982 -0.249* 2.758 -2.055 14.486** 0.294 26
1983 -0.185 -2.178 -2.563 16.875** 0.202 26
1984 -0.155** -3.524** -1.295 15.421*** 0.410 26
1985 -0.109** -3.707*** -0.377 12.911*** 0.304 26
1986 0.094 -0.095 2.051 -1.733 0.067 26
1987 0.047 1.619 1.347 -1.075 0.107 26
1988 0.045 2.312** 0.304 -2.192 0.187 26
1989 -0.075 1.040 -0.202 4.454 0.181 26
1990 -0.097 1.034 0.208 5.417 0.205 26
1991 -0.066 0.382 0.884 4.466 0.095 26
1992 0.023 0.863 1.144 -0.182 0.063 26
1993 0.129 2.022 1.896 -8.202 0.261 26
1994 -0.152** -0.087 0.697 11.265** 0.282 26
1995 -0.130* -0.128 0.811 9.467* 0.294 26
1996 -0.250 -0.727 0.475 17.488 0.194 26
1997 -0.083 0.298 0.285 5.399 0.203 26
*,**,*** Coefficient different from zero with an error probability of 10%, 5%, 1%.
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Table 8: Yearly OLS-regressions of extended model for specialists
Year L.DENS L.GPOP  MEDUNI Constant R2  N
1963 -0.006 0.971 -0.817 -0.833 0.088 23
1964 -0.009 1.037 -1.131 -1.435 0.105 23
1965 -0.053 2.889*** -0.232 0.547 0.323 23
1966 -0.040 1.525*** -0.368 2.482 0.216 23
1967 -0.021 1.611*** -1.289 2.253 0.275 24
1968 0.012 0.458*** -0.525 1.625* 0.526 24
1969 0.020 0.109 0.229 0.781 0.179 24
1970 0.014 -0.818*** 0.614 1.917 0.501 25
1971 -0.061 1.367 2.498 2.931 0.137 25
1972 -0.133 -0.047 3.663 9.293* 0.129 25
1973 -0.064 -2.133 -0.080 9.848* 0.116 25
1974 -0.074 -0.175 -0.766 9.556 0.101 25
1975 0.021 2.506 -2.773* 4.151*** 0.209 25
1976 -0.013 3.053* -1.185 7.385*** 0.194 25
1977 -0.082* 0.089 1.570 9.886*** 0.245 25
1978 -0.080** 0.073 1.993 10.293*** 0.229 25
1979 -0.076** 0.742 3.438** 9.375*** 0.233 25
1980 -0.022 1.792** 2.605 5.038 0.152 25
1981 -0.037 1.250 2.185 7.859*** 0.106 26
1982 -0.030 1.933 1.530 6.408** 0.058 26
1983 -0.119** -1.154 4.121 14.037*** 0.221 26
1984 -0.085** 0.746 2.766 9.998*** 0.272 26
1985 -0.064 -0.117 1.141 9.667*** 0.246 26
1986 0.018 1.186 -1.189 2.446 0.028 26
1987 0.003 0.306 -0.416 3.097 0.007 26
1988 0.015 2.432** -0.734 -0.499 0.169 26
1989 -0.033 -0.967 1.377 5.250 0.078 26
1990 -0.018 -0.870 0.624 4.203 0.026 26
1991 -0.010 -0.485 1.060 4.348* 0.006 26
1992 0.019 -0.781 -0.317 3.032 0.091 26
1993 0.003 -0.952 0.355 4.353** 0.053 26
1994 -0.006 1.748 1.530 2.343 0.077 26
1995 -0.014 2.216* 2.154 2.712 0.180 26
1996 0.001 1.318 0.199 2.879** 0.135 26
1997 -0.145 0.682 -0.710 6.444*** 0.266 26
*,**,*** Coefficient different from zero with an error probability of 10%, 5%, 1%.
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